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Abstract
In recent years, terrorism and radicalization has been a consistent issue that many countries have
faced. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been the most recent in a long trail of
organizations that have sought to strike terror against the western world. However, ISIS is
distinguished from other groups, like Al-Qaeda, in that ISIS supports a complex propaganda
machine. Although ISIS is not the first organization to use the social media platform, they are the
first to use it with such diversity. The two main channels that ISIS uses to spread their
propaganda messages are through social media sites such as Twitter and through online journals
such as the Dabiq. Recent research has attempted to determine how recruitment messages are
being received and which messages trigger recruitment. It is the goal of this paper to determine
which messages are salient, and the psychological constructs that support them. By coding
messages for appeals to identity, need for cognitive closure, time pressure, and appeals to
ideology, the researchers expect that the two main channels of ISIS propaganda differ in their
messages. We hypothesize that Twitter messages will be targeted towards novice ISIS
sympathizers, whereas the Dabiq will be focused on already-radicalized individuals who have
moved past the introduction of the radical ideology.

Keywords: Terrorism, propaganda, extremism, ISIS, social media, intergroup biases

EXAMINING THE CHANNELS OF TERRRORIST PROPAGANDA

4

Hard Copy versus #Hashtag: Examining the Channels of Terrorist Propaganda
In the past several decades, countries in the Western hemisphere have been on the
defense from terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State in Syria
(ISIS), promote the spread of their beliefs through violence, by threatening the lives of noncombatants. Leaders and policy makers attempt to reduce the number of attacks by terrorist
organizations by both military action and policy. In the United States, policy makers have
approach the threat of ISIS with the same counterterrorism measures they used against Al Qaeda
(Cronin, 2015). Governments around the world, such as Turkey, Russia, Canada, and France
combat ISIS controlled territories with near daily bombing campaigns, soldiers, and economic
sanctions (Fantz, 2015; United Nations, 2015). Although ISIS is losing ground in Syria and Iraq,
the organization has been able to launch deadly attacks in Western countries (e.g., Brussels
airport attack on the 22nd of March, 2016; Charlie Hebo attack in France on the 7th of January,
2015). Also on the rise are directed lone-actor terrorist attacks (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014).
Terrorist organizations flourish by their ability to recruit new members to their cause and
to their methods. The current project addresses ISIS’s methods of recruitment of foreign fighters,
in hopes that an understanding of terrorist recruitment of these actors will lead to a reduction in
the threats of terrorism to those targeted by such attacks.
Early Recruitment Methods
In 2009, a document titled A Course in the Art of Recruitment was retrieved by the
United States Government. This document was designed for novice Islamic Terrorist recruiters
as a way to grade the performance and pathways of potential recruits (Fishman & Warius, 2009).
The handbook identifies the types of individuals that Al-Qaeda targeted; primarily uneducated,
non-religious, and non-questioning individuals. This recruitment handbook contained recruiter
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decision points that served as a flow chart, where certain reactions by the recruit would lead to
different responses from the recruiter. For example, the recruit may discuss that they are
interested in Islam, which would cue the recruiter to discuss Islamic teachings related to Jihad.
The discovery of this recruitment manual indicates that recruitment by terrorist organizations is
becoming more directed and individually tailored to accommodate specific audiences.
Foreign Fighters
Unlike Al Qaeda, who focused recruitment locally and in surrounding areas, ISIS
recruiters have broaden their reach and expanded their recruitment methods. Instead of focusing
its efforts on local recruitment and recruitment from surrounding areas, ISIS recruiters have
targeted recruits from Africa, Europe, and North America (Day, 2016). ISIS releases non-Arabic
propaganda, such as the Dabiq (a news and propaganda magazine) and messages on Twitter, in
an effort to reach those who are interested in their message but restricted by language and
location (Winter, 2015b).
These expanded target areas and techniques seem to be working. Since 2014 there has
been an estimated 27 to 31 thousand foreign fighters from over 86 countries who have traveled to
the Syria and Iraq to fight for ISIS, with only about 20-to-30-percent of fighters returning to their
Western countries (The Soufan Group, 2015). Of those thousands of foreign fighters, roughly
300 came from the Americas (The Soufan Group). The Soufan Group (2015) showed that the
numbers of fighters leaving from Asia and Russia are rapidly increasing at a rate of 300-percent
from 2014 to 2015. The same report showed that in 2014, 2,500 foreign fighters from Western
Europe had made the voyage to fight with ISIS. This number doubled in 2015. The lack of
growth in foreign fighters in the North America does not represent the substantial growth in
recruitment around the globe. For instance, ISIS recruits from the Balkans doubled, and perhaps
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tripled, from 2014 to 2015 (The Soufan Group, 2015). Scholars attribute the success of ISIS
recruitment of foreign fighters largely to its use of social media and creative promotion of its
activities through the Dabiq magazine.
The type of individuals who join extremist organizations vary by the region (Gates &
Podder, 2015; Rosenblatt, 2016). The variety in the profiles of foreign recruits makes it difficult
for security professionals to monitor the number of people leaving their countries in the Western
hemisphere to fight for groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. Terrorist recruits face many
dangers as they attempt to subversively travel to the Middle East to train and fight on the front
lines. Numerous cases exist of individuals who were captured attempting to leave their home
countries to join ISIS. In Turkey, a 24-year-old Japanese man was detained and prevented from
traveling to Syria to join ISIS (Shankar, 2016). To date, 108 men and women from New York,
Ohio, Wisconsin, etc. have also been detained and prevented from joining ISIS (Goldman, Yang,
& Muyskens, 2017).
To combat the challenges of asking foreign fighters to join the front lines in Syria, ISIS
has instructed foreign fighters to remain in their home countries. James, Jensen, and Tinsley
(2015) found that instead of making pleas for hijrah (travel to fight in the middle east), groups
like ISIS are pushing for foreign fighters to stay in their Western countries and fight from within,
to conduct terrorist attacks in their home countries on behalf of ISIS. This method of fighting
prevents detection of ISIS recruits as they would attempt to travel to the Middle East. The
recruits can reach the aims of the terrorist organization by committing acts of terror and violence
in their home countries.
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Online Recruitment
If ISIS asks foreign fighters to remain in their home countries, recruitment efforts and
contact with these recruits must occur over a distance. For ISIS this distance is bridged through
the Internet and social media. The first terrorist organization to use the internet to spread their
ideology was The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in 1996. The Internet made it easier
for The Túpac Amaru to spread their message globally without involving external media outlets,
like BBC or CNN (Denning, 2009). Since then, the process of terrorism recruitment has become
globalized and decentralized (Gates et al., 2015; Pace, 2014). Decentralization proves to not only
increase security for ISIS’s leaders, but it also allows for tactical innovations and the
establishment of brother/sister organizations working towards the same goal (Pace, 2014).
ISIS has also successfully globalized itself, allowing for a greater spread of fear, a gain in
sympathizers, and a larger spread of attacks (Cozine, 2016). Part of this globalization has been
the use of borderless avenues, such as Twitter and the online journal titled the Dabiq, which is
published in over 4 languages including English, French, and German. Social media has removed
the border lines and opened communication between members of terrorist organizations and
individuals living in other countries who might be sympathetic to the terrorist cause (Thompson,
2011). For instance, ISIS supporting Twitter accounts had an average of 1,000 followers, much
larger than the average of 208 followers for regular users (Berger & Morgan, 2015). These
efforts helped ISIS gain pledged affiliates from 18 countries/territories, foreign fighters from
80-90 countries/territories, and over 20,000 English-language Twitter followers (Cozine, 2016).
Social Media is the new platform for recruitment, yet there is little research as to what messages
are being sent, as well as what types of individuals are receiving them.
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Channels of Recruitment
ISIS uses several channels to disseminate their radical ideology to the masses. They have
assembled an intricate web of media outlets that cater to their message. There are around 35
small media outlets, feeding into six larger outlets, which are all encompassed under the
umbrella of ISIS’s Central Leadership (Winter, 2015b). There are two primary forms of
globalized radical recruitment, namely online journals and social media (Berger & Morgan,
2015; Gambhir, 2014; Nacos, 2016). The Dabiq has the most publications of any journal that
ISIS has yet to release, their first being The Islamic State Report (June 3rd, 2014 to July 5th,
2014) and most recent being the Rumiyah (Gambhir, 2014; The Clarion Project, 2014). Twitter
is also the most widely used open access social media engine by ISIS, partly due to other sites,
like Facebook, becoming more strict (Berger, et al. 2015; Winter, 2015a). These two channels of
recruitment are important to the structure of ISIS and their recruiting base, as each of them offer
something different to the reader.
Dabiq. The Dabiq is a journal published online and distributed by the Al-Hayat Media
Center (ISIS’s propaganda hub). The purpose of the Dabiq is to confirm the in-group identity of
ISIS, by using messages that focus on demonization of the Western world (Ingram, 2016).
Gambhir (2014) claims that the Dabiq is much more than a propaganda magazine, rather is a
vehicle to carry the religious and ideological superiority of ISIS to current fighters, future
fighters, and enemies alike. The Dabiq is mainly used to present the supposed countless military
“victories”, in an attempt to garner support and instill fear (Gambhir, 2014). The journal uses
these stories of military victories, and justifications of political violence to trigger “awakenings”
in its readers, reinforcing the draw to join (Ingram, 2016).
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The Dabiq is readily available online, giving access to anyone who knows it exists and is
interested in its messages. The journal focuses more on theology, and blurs the lines between
politics and religion (Greene, 2015). The Dabiq takes a staunch moral high ground, enforcing the
idea of a lack of freedom of choice, and a firm distinction between right and wrong (Greene,
2015). The Dabiq makes no attempt to spare the readers the gruesome and violent details and
imagery of their conquests (Gambhir, 2014; Greene, 2015). It also reinforces the message of an
impending Armageddon, pleading for faithful Muslims to take arms in their cause (Winter,
2015b). The Dabiq’s messages are targeted to open-minded Muslims, as well as those who are
already very familiar with ISIS’s brand of religious doctrine.
Twitter. Twitter has gained popularity among ISIS members and sympathizers in recent
years, with roughly 60% of their total accounts from 2008 to 2015 being created in 2014 (Berger
et al., 2015). Twitter has allowed for not only thousands of foreign fighters to be recruited, but it
also has led the way to group cohesion among ISIS recruiters who can now easily communicate
with each other (Greene, 2015). Due to this new form of spreading ideology, ISIS has adapted
their tactics to carry their messages further, mastering the use of social media (Vitale & Keagle,
2014). To spread their message on a larger scale, ISIS created an application called “The Dawn
of Glad Tidings” which automatically disseminated pre-approved ISIS messages via Twitter
posts (Irshaid, 2014). Although ISIS’s posts on Twitter are not directly religiously oriented, they
impart religious rhetoric, such as “Allah is good”, “sins”, “disbelievers”, in part to infuse their
messages with religious ideology (Bodine-Baron, Helmus, Magnuson, and Wikelman, 2016).
ISIS is using to spread strategically planned messages to a broad audience. These
messages are very specific to the audience, focusing on foreigners. Klausen (2015) found that
70-percent of tweets by Westerners were “retweets” (shared posts from other accounts) and not
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original content. This suggests that those sharing these messages with others are a novice
audience. Reaching out to a new audience is the goal of ISIS’ Twitter campaign. ISIS supporters
have co-opted popular hashtags, such as the ones popular during the 2014 World Cup in Brazil
(Vitale, et al. 2014). Since these new followers are not well-versed in the Quran, ISIS focuses
more on spreading the political messages of their organization, rather than the religious ones
(Magdy, Darwish, & Weber, 2015). ISIS is also greatly concerned with the image that they are
representing to their new audience. Winter (2015a) found that the most common theme of their
tweets was a “Utopia”. The reason for the focus on less violent themes on Twitter seems to be
that Twitter is primarily used to reach a new audience, lower in the stages of radicalization. This
“Ground Floor” on the staircase to radicalization is where recruiters and sympathizers introduce
individuals to ideas of political injustice and perceived deprivation, which would appeal to a
broader audience (Moghaddam, 2005). The speed, pervasiveness, and openness of Twitter allows
ISIS to spread their ideas and capture the attention of potential recruits.
Need for Cognitive Closure, Ideology, and Urgency
Earlier work by Kruglanski et al. (1983) found that elevating the need for cognitive
closure (NCC) through time pressure increased subjects' tendency to succumb to primacy effects
in impression formation, causing them to make judgments with little investigation into the
problem. Need for Cognitive Closure inhibits an individual from forming alternative hypotheses.
Webster et al. (1994) found a small positive correlation for impulsivity and need for closure,
indicating that these are not distinct concepts. Further, those with high need for closure were
more confident in their judgments (Webster, et al. 1994). The judgment process under time
pressure is disrupted, lending to decisions based on limited evidence. This is “epistemic
freezing”, where the layperson becomes unaware of conflicting arguments, causes a judgment
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change in the individual, reducing the evaluation made before making a decision (Kruglasnki, et
al. 1983). This pattern shows that although individuals are making baseless decisions, they are
not inherently impulsive, and strongly adhere to their decision.
Ideologies that are established and have highly structured formats are more readily
accepted by people who have a high Need for Cognitive Closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010).
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) divided individuals into two types, certainty- and uncertaintyoriented individuals. Certainty-oriented individuals tend to have a closed-minded attitude
towards new information. Conversely, uncertainty-oriented individuals are more open to novel
information that is inconsistent with their current viewpoint. This predisposition to new ideas
could potentially be a reason why some individuals are more receptive to radical ideas than
others.
Many feel that the war against terrorism is just as much an ideological war as it is a
physical one, as ISIS commonly uses the idea of helping out Muslim brothers against an
oppressor (Daymon, 2015). In a press conference on terrorism, President Barrack Obama (2015)
stated that, “you cannot fight an ideological war with guns; you must defeat it with better ideas.”
The wide spread of ideology is not limited to internet websites for adults and children alike, ISIS
also makes use of entertaining media (Thompson, 2011).
Although there are obvious inconsistencies between ISIS doctrine and traditional Islam,
many journalists and politicians still hold that ISIS is based on a religious ideology (Pelletier,
Lundmark, Gardner, Ligon, & Kilinc, 2016). Because of ISIS’ perceived tie to Islam, the
ideological drive that is used for recruitment is the narrative that, by joining ISIS, one would be
helping Muslim brothers in combat against outsiders (Daymon, 2015). The overarching theme in
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this type of rhetoric is that there is a clear right versus wrong, and someone is to blame for the
suffering of Muslims (Borum, 2011).
Unlike Al-Qaeda, ISIS thrives on this idea of the “impending apocalypse”, and uses this
narrative to pressure individuals into “getting right with Allah” (MoCants, 2015, p. 28). By
priming a person with high Need for Cognitive Closure with a time-sensitive ideological
message, such as an apocalyptic message from the Quran, a recruiter can manipulate the urgency
of the message to drive the person to agree with their goals. Messages appear to target ideology,
with a time pressure focus using an “apocalypse” narrative (MoCant, 2015; Kruglanski &
Freund, 1983). Other messages are identity driven, reaching out to individuals by targeting those
who are already isolated from their surrounding networks (Borum, 2011).
Isolation
Colleen LaRose (aka Jihad Jane) was a community outcast that was isolated from her
family and friends (Halverson & Way, 2012). Researchers have suggested that loose community
ties and a feeling of isolation predicts the joining of an extremist organization (Borum, 2011).
The manipulation of this isolation is used in determining an individual’s chances of successfully
completing the recruitment process (Al Qa’idy, 2010). Borum (2011) found that a sense of
belonging to an organization that offers comradery helps an individual avoid a sense of isolation.
For instance, the lack of a social identity can lead to an individual to seek out group membership,
even with extremist groups like ISIS (Borum, 2011). In a case study of foreign fighters, Lankford
(2014) found that social isolation was one of four main factors (along with depression, guilt and
shame, and hopelessness) that cause an individual to join a terrorist organization. Whether it be
isolation or “needing to belong”, the result is the same, a push for an individual to accept a new
doctrine and fight for a radical cause.
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Identity Theory and Intergroup Biases
Once an individual perceives unfairness, disenfranchisement, or dissatisfaction with their
current situation, the next step would be seeking out a group with which they identify. A person
considering to join an extremist group will go through three identity cycles: cultural identity,
social identity, and personal identity (Schwartz, Dunkel, & Waterman, 2009). Social identity
theory is used to explain how individuals link their self-concept as a member of a larger entity
with intergroup relations. The process of an individual identifying with ISIS works the same
way, by using the demonization of Islam by those in the West to create a polarization of beliefs,
and eventually the involvement in an extremist organization (Raffie, 2013). Moghaddam (2005)
describes the disgruntled feeling, directed at the Western world, as the Ground Floor on the
staircase to terrorism, where an individual feels dissatisfied with how they are being treated or
perceived by society. This ground level that Moghaddam (2005) describes catapults an
individual to the “first floor”, which involves seeking out a group with which to fight this unfair
treatment. Further, when dealing with feelings of unfairness, an individual will experience
uncertainty in their identity and will be more likely to identify with a group they feel is higher in
entitativity (cohesive group qualities; Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2005).
Religiosity and Conservatism
In a review of causes for extremism Borum (2011) found that religion and theological
understanding only showed prominence in a subset of examined recruitment cases. Borum
concluded that religion is merely a vehicle for fulfilling goals, not necessarily the goal itself. If
terrorist recruiters use ideological messages to convince others to join their cause, they must
select ideological statements that connect with the population they are trying to reach. The base
assumption of many Americans is that all terrorists are devout believers in Islam. However, this
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often does not necessarily transfer over to those who become radicalized. For example, Colleen
LaRose (aka Jihad Jane) was a White, middle-aged American woman who had multiple divorces
and no background in Islamic teaching, yet she was picked out by an online recruiter as a wife
for a fighter (Halverson et al., 2012). The recruit may not have any Islamic knowledge, but the
recruiters themselves also tend to struggle with their religious knowledge. The online recruiter
manual uncovered in 2009 (Fishman & Warius, 2009) even states that the “Individual Da’wa”
(preaching Islam to the individual) used online makes it easier for recruiters who are not very
familiar with sharia law to convey the message of Islam. The religious component of the
messages may not be what’s important to the recruit, rather it signals the credibility of the
extremist group.
Summary and Hypotheses
Research to date has shown conflicting results on plausible psychological warning signs
of an individual’s likelihood to join a terrorist organization, and material indicators are even less
predictive. Actions, such as acquiring weapons, often do not indicate a capability to commit a
terrorist act (Schurman & Eijkman, 2015). More to this point, Schurman et al. (2015) noted that
when looking back at terrorist’s patterns of behavior before their attack, attackers engage in more
chaos and non-linear action than a clearly established organizational structure. Due to the
diversity in the initial stages in leading to radicalization, behavioral indicators related specifically
to security concerns might not be the best option for research. Other research has indicated that
even focusing on the “psychology of terrorism” based on mental disorders does not result in
predictive power (Borum, 2014). Borum (2014) suggests that it might be more useful to explore
vulnerabilities and propensities towards terrorism.
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The messages of ISIS’s propaganda are targeted at an individual’s vulnerabilities. The
Dabiq uses religious justification and politics to motivate individuals to join ISIS and commit
hijrah (engage in a sacred journey; Gambhir, 2014). Twitter, on the other hand, offers more
about the progress of the insurgency, using false claims of victories as motivation (Klausen,
2014). We hypothesize that the Dabiq will be targeted more towards individuals further through
the stages of radicalization (Schurman & Eijkman, 2015), when ideological development is at an
extreme level and when organizational development is focused on strengthening an existing
group identity. One feature of the Dabiq that supports this hypothesis is that the Dabiq is harder
to attain compared to Twitter messages, which are readily accessible to a broad audience. Also,
articles in the Dabiq likely will have more motivational messages, appealing to those further
along in the radicalization process, whereas Twitter posts will have more idealistic and personaloriented posts, appealing to those at the early stages of radicalization, when group identity is at
its weakest.
This pattern will be revealed further by the Dabiq showing more time-pressure messages
targeting individuals with a high need for cognitive closure, and Twitter messages using
encouraging individuals to connect with the group through a broad social identity message (e.g.,
one highlighting the plights of Muslims in the Middle East). We expect to see this pattern
because the Dabiq, given its targets tend to be those further along in the radicalization process, is
intended to keep fighters informed and motivated, whereas Twitter messages are meant to entice
new recruits. Lastly, we expect to see that Dabiq articles will contain far more religiouslyoriented content, targeted at already-indoctrinated individuals who would more readily accept the
social identity of ISIS, compared to Twitter messages that are more broadly targeted at
ideologies held by those at the beginning stages of radicalization. This study will determine the
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types of messages in each of the channels of propaganda as a way to identify how counter
terrorism research can be targeted to different audiences, and formulated to fit into different
channels.
Hypotheses
1. Printed Channels (Dabiq) will be targeted more towards individuals further down the
stages of radicalization, showing more social identity directed messages, compared to
Twitter posts.
2. Columns in the Dabiq will have more motivational messages, represented by time
pressure appeals, whereas Twitter posts will have more idealistic and personal posts,
represented by a high push for enlistment.
3. Dabiq columns will have more religious content compared to Twitter posts (tweets).
Method
Participants (Sample)
The sample for the current study is a random draw from a bank of 450 publically
available Twitter posts of suspected ISIS sympathizers and recruiters. The Twitter post bank
came from a search of 9 popular ISIS-related hashtags (see Table 1), such as
#DespitetheDisbelievers, عاجل# (#Urgent), and #IslamicCaliphate (#Caliph, #Khilafah; see
Magdy, Darwish, & Weber, 2015). The comparison group was taken from publically available
written columns inside 13 of the 15 issues of the Islamic State journal, the Dabiq Magazine
(Clarion Project, 2014) Issues 12 and 13 of the Dabiq were removed from these analyses, as the
columns in them did not correspond to the previous issues or the following issues. The analyzed
issues contained Articles (N = 39), Statements (N = 5), and Reports (N = 31), whereas issues 12
and 13 used different titles for their columns that were not comparable to other issues or
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mentioned in previous research.
Materials/Coding
Researchers in the current study coded ISIS propaganda distributed through two distinct
channels, Twitter and the Dabiq magazine. Tweets were collected in batches on Twitter
associated with relevant hashtags, whereas the Dabiq was collected through non-disclosed sites
on the internet. Tweets were collected from March 13th, 2017 to March 14th, 2017. The dates of
initial tweet posting ranged from the 14th of May, 2014, and extended to the 14th of March, 2017.
Tweets collected from 2014 to 2015 made up 28.57-percent (N = 16) of the sample, whereas
tweets from 2016 to 2017 made up the majority of the sample, 71.43-percent (N = 40). The
issues of the Dabiq were collected from August 1st, 2016, to February 22nd, 2017. The issues of
the Dabiq span from April, 2014 to April, 2016 (see Figure 1.).

40
35
30
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20
15
10
5
0

Number of Columns
Number of Tweets

2014

2015

2016

2017

Year of Publication

Figure 1. Comparing the Publication Date of Columns and Tweets

Dabiq. In total, researchers in the current study coded 74 written columns, with an
average page length of 2.91 pages (Std. = 2.21), with a range of .5 pages to 11 pages. Findings
indicated that Allah was mentioned in 71 columns (95.9%). Allah being mentioned was broken
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into three subcategories: Formal, Informal, and Both. Allah was mentioned in a formal context in
7 columns (9.9%), informally in 26 columns (36.6%), and mentioned both formally and
informally 38 columns (53.3%). Each column only contained one subcategory of “Allah
Mentioned.” This high usage of “Allah” was expected, as ISIS uses Religiosity as a cornerstone
of their ideology. By calling themselves a “Caliphate” they are claiming themselves to be an
overtly religious organization. We then were interested in the types of columns written, whether
they were Articles, Statements, or Reports. The Dabiq explicitly stated the column type on each
page. Between the 13 issues, there were 39 Articles (52%), 5 Statements (6.7%), and 31 Reports
(41.3%). Other types of columns, such as “Interview,” “Special,” and “Enemy’s Words” were
not coded, as they were not consistently a part of every Issue. The single Statement piece was
included, as it was also included in previous research by Gambhir (2014).
Twitter. For Twitter, 53 tweets were analyzed from the original 450 that were collected.
Tweets were discovered using 9 hashtags (Table 1). These 9 hashtags were either collected from
previous research (i.e. Magdy et al., 2015), or determined relevant due to their current popularity
among confirmed ISIS accounts. Some hashtags, such as #Inshallah, are used by the Muslim
community at large, and do not indicate automatic ISIS affiliations and were not treated as such.
Univariate statistics showed that Allah was mentioned in 14 tweets (26.4%), and of those, only
mentioned in a formal context (ex. at the end of a sentence, the author states “Inshallah”) 4 times
(8%). The other 10 times Allah was mentioned were considered informal (ex. “Allah is the one
and true God”). Next, the types of tweets were examined, whether they were Retweets (n = 3,
5.7%), Statements (n = 49, 92.5%), or Reports (n = 1, 1.9%; see Table 2).
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Table 1
9 Hashtags used for this study
Hashtag

Source

#DespitetheDisbelievers

Magdy et al., 2015

عاجل# (#Urgent)

Magdy et al., 2015

#Mujahideen

Popular in March, 2017

#Hijrah

Popular in March, 2017

#IslamicCaliphate (#Caliph, #Khilafah)

Magdy et al., 2015

#IslamicState (#ISIS, #ISIL)

The ISIS Twitter Census, 2015

#Jihad

Popular in March, 2017

#Inshallah

Popular in March, 2017

#Dieinyourrage

Popular in March, 2017

Table 2
Types of Tweets with Descriptions and Univariate Statistics
Tweet Type

Description

N

%.

Retweet

No statement, just a repost/direct quote

3

5.7

Statement

Opinion, can have a repost/quote with it

49

92.5

Report

Informative post, no opinions.

1

1.9

Procedure
Trained researchers coded tweets and columns for relevant themes reflecting the use of
ideology, time pressure, religiosity, isolation, and social identity (see Table 3). To test the
reliability of coding decisions, two researchers coded 30 tweets from each of the nine hashtags
categories (n = 270). Both researchers identified whether the tweet represented an ISIS-affiliated.
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Table 3
Examples of Types of Messages within the Dabiq and Twitter
Type of Message

Keywords in Twitter and the Dabiq

Time Pressure

End Times, Apocalypse, Day of Resurrection, Judgment

Religiosity/Conservatism

Quran, Hadith, Mujahideen, Hijra, Caliph, Islam

Social Identity

Kuffar, Brotherhood, Organization, Caliphate, Superior

Isolation

Family, Community, Close-knit, Muslim, Lonliness

Ideology

World Domination, Sharia, Evangelize, Superiority

Allah

Allah (formal vs. informal)

The same two researchers then coded the tweets for the presence or absence of the relevant
themes (see Table 4).
Table 4
Interrater Reliability for Two Coders, for the Dabiq and Twitter
Dabiq (N = 34)

Twitter (N = 56)

Variable

K

p-value

K

p-value

Allah Mentioned

x

x

.96

<.0005

Religiosity

.80

< .0005

.93

<.0005

Time Pressure

.85

< .0005

.81

<.0005

Social Identity

.94

< .0005

.95

<.0005

Isolation

.79

< .0005

x

x

Ideology

.84

< .0005

.74

<.0005

Push for Enlistment

.80

< .0005

x

x

x – variable was not computed because coding was constant across items.
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The 13 issues of the Dabiq were first coded for the three column types (articles,
statements, and reports). Researchers initially read the columns, then identified key phrases
relating to our constructs of interest during a follow-up reading. Researchers coded whether the
relevant themes were present or absent in each of the columns according to the statements
identified in the column. Interrater reliability for these decisions can be viewed in Table 4.
Interrater Reliability
Dabiq. To determine interrater reliability for the coding of the Dabiq, a series of Cohen’s
Kappa (k) analyses were conducted on whether Allah was mentioned, religiosity, time pressure,
social identity, isolation, ideology, and push for enlistment. The K-values are displayed in
Table 4. Interrater reliability was significant for all variables, showing that the coding between
the two raters was very similar. As discussed by Viera and Garrett (2005), a rating of .610 and
above constitutes “substantial agreement.”
Twitter. A series of Cohen’s Kappa tests were also conducted for both tweet selection
and the coding of the tweets themselves. For the tweet selection, there was substantial agreement
between the two coders, K = .682, p < .001. Agreed upon tweets were then further analyzed.
Cohen’s Kappa analyses were conducted on the same factors as the Dabiq: whether Allah was
mentioned, religiosity, time pressure, social identity, Isolation, ideology, and push for enlistment.
All of the K-values were above the .61 threshold, except for isolation and push for enlistment,
which could not be calculated because the ratings were constant, indicating complete interrater
agreement on those factors. Table 4 shows interrater reliability for coding of the selected Tweets.
Results
A series of Pearson chi-square tests were conducted to determine the pattern of
relationship between our series of categorical variables. Some of the chi-square cells frequencies
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were less than five, violating the sample size assumption of the chi-square test. Because of this, a
Yate’s correction test was conducted, and showed no discernable difference in direction,
magnitude, or significance values. All the statistics for the relationships between our Dependent
Variables and Independent Variables can be found in Table 5.
Table 5
Chi-Square Statistics for Comparison of Twitter and Dabiq
Dabiq n(%)

Twitter n(%)

Variables

Absent

Present

Absent

Present

N

χ2

Allah
Mentioned

3

71

40

16

130

65.37**

(4%)

(96%)

(71%)

(29%)

Religiosity

12

62

27

29

130

15.54**

(16%)

(84%)

(48%)

(52%)

Time
Pressure

55

19

51

5

(74%)

(26%)

(91%)

(9%)

130

5.94*

Social ID

18

56

12

44

130

.15

(24%)

(76%)

(21%)

(79%)

64

8

6.64*

(11%)

0
(0%)

128

(89%)

56
(100%)

17

57

12

44

130

.04

(23%)

(77%)

(21%)

(79%)

54

20

0

130

17.89**

(73%)

(27%)

56
(100%)

Formal

Informal

Both

Formal

Informal

Both

26

7

38

11

6

0

88

17.68**

(37%)

(9%)

(54%) (65%)

(35%)

(0%)

Isolation
Ideology
Enlistment
Allah
Formality1

0%

* Significant at the level of <.05
** Significant at the level of <.005
1Only valid for Allah Formality, where options are: Both, Formal, and Informal. Absent and Present titles are
not used in this row.
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Dabiq. Religiosity was a large part of the columns in the Dabiq. Coding found religious1
messages in 62 columns (83.3%). Lastly, we looked at whether or not there was a clear push for
enlistment in each column. Of the 13 issues examined, we found that 54 columns (73%) had a
clear targeted message for recruitment. The presence of time pressure, social identity, isolation,
and ideology was assessed in each column. Any single column could have any combination of
these constructs. Findings showed 20 columns (27%) that included time pressure messages, 56
columns (75.7%) with messages targeted at social identity, 8 columns (11.1%) containing
isolation-driven messages, and 57 columns (77%) with ideological messages. There was also no
uniformity in the number of column types present in each issue. This variation in the column
type may be explained by key events in their timeline, presented in Figure 2.

Frequency of Column Type

May 17, 2015
ISIS Takes
Ramadi, Syria

Aug, 7, 2014
US Joins fight
against ISIS

7
6

Oct. 16, 2016
ISIS loses
Dabiq, Syria

5
4
3
2
1
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1412

1513

Issue Number
Statements

Reports

Articles

Figure 2. Columns present by issue of the Dabiq, with events from Appendix A.

1

Religious messages excluded whether Allah was mentioned, as this did not indicate religiosity
of the columns content, rather it was more of a formality.
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Twitter. Next, the content of the tweets was examined. Any single tweet could have any
combination of the following constructs. First, Religiosity of the messages was coded to
determine whether religion1 (i.e. scripture), recruitment, or isolation played a role in the content
of tweets. Findings indicate that Religiosity was a part of 26 tweets (49.1%), and none of them
had a clear message that pushed for recruitment or messages enforcing isolation. Following that,
time pressure, social identity, and ideology were coded for each tweet. Findings indicate that
time pressure messages occurred in five columns (9.4%), whereas the vast majority (n = 48,
90.6%) of tweets made no mention of time pressure concepts. Social identity, particularly
relating to messages of intergroup biases, were present in 43 tweets (81.1%). Ideological
messages were present in 41 (77.4%) tweets.
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis stated that the Dabiq would be targeted more towards
individuals further down the stages of radicalization compared to Twitter, in the form of a higher
amount of social identity driven content. Contrary to our first hypothesis, there was no statistical
difference between the channels of propaganda in their focus on social identity, χ 2(1) = .15,
p = .834.
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis stated that columns in the Dabiq would have more
motivational messages, whereas tweets would have more idealistic and personal posts. Partially
confirming our second hypothesis, the issues of the Dabiq included significantly more emphasis
on time pressure (Need for Cognitive Closure driven appeals) compared to tweets, χ2(1) = 5.94,
p = .02. However, the Dabiq also presented significantly more appeals for enlistment compared
to Twitter [χ2(1) = 17.89, p <. 0005], which is contrary to the second half our second hypothesis,.
Hypothesis 3. Our last hypothesis stated that Dabiq articles will have more religious
content compared to Twitter posts. Allah was mentioned significantly less in tweets, as
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compared to the issues of the Dabiq which mentioned Allah more frequently, χ2(1) = 65.37,
p < .0005. Also, the Dabiq focused far more on religious messages, whereas Twitter had a more
even split between non-religious and religious rhetoric, χ2(1) = 15.54, p <. 0005. These findings
confirm our third hypothesis, that the printed channel (the Dabiq) contains more religiously
oriented content than the online channel (Twitter).
Findings both supported and contradicted the empirically driven hypotheses in the current
study. The different channels of propaganda (the Dabiq and Twitter) did not differ in their social
identity driven content. It seemed that those sending messages through the different channels
used social identity appeals, such as referring to outgroup members as Kuffar and ingroup
members as brothers, similarly. Secondly, not only did the Dabiq contain more emphasis on time
pressure, but it also contained more overt pushes for recruitment. This was contradictory to our
hypotheses, suggesting that the Dabiq might have targeted those less connected to the terrorist
organization and those individuals who might be compelled to join the organization. Lastly,
results confirmed that the Dabiq relied far more on religious content than tweets. This suggests
that these messages were targeted to a devoted group of followers, or at least to those who would
be familiar with or identify with these religious messages.
Discussion
Research in the field of radicalization and countering violent extremism is growing, and
there is a trajectory towards the interest of terrorist propaganda by violent extremist groups. To
date, this interest has focused in observing only one of two distinct channels of propaganda,
printed propaganda material and social media posts. Research of the content of different channels
has yet to compare the differences and similarities of messages across channels. The current
study was an attempt to compare these two channels to determine whether messages within these
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two channels differed in their targeted messages. We found interesting results that challenged
previously held conceptions of the differences between these channels. The Dabiq and Twitter
were more similar than we originally hypothesized.
We hypothesized that the Dabiq would be targeted more towards individuals further
down the stages of radicalization compared to Twitter, which would serve as an introduction to
the ideology (Winter, 2015a). This was, in part, because the Dabiq was not as easy to access, and
the journal itself was not as well-known as Twitter. Also, the Dabiq was terminated and replaced
by Rumiyah (translation: Rome) in September, 2016, likely due to the fall of the ISIS held area
of Dabiq, Syria. This change in title could have further restricted access to longer, narrative-style
appeals.
The first hypothesis sought to determine if the Dabiq would present stronger social
identity messages compared to Twitter. Statistics revealed that this was not the case, revealing no
statistical difference in identity messages between both channels. This appears to be a direct
result of the timeline of the issues of the Dabiq, as they relate to key tactical victories and losses.
As shown in Appendix A, the first 11 issues of the Dabiq were released in periods when ISIS
was gaining ground and capturing strategic locations in Syria. The strategic position of ISIS
changed, however, before the release of Issue 12, when ISIS began losing previously-held
territory, due in large part to Turkish and Free Syrian Army operations as well as Russian and
U.S. Airstrikes (Glenn, 2016). The entitativity of ISIS began to be challenged with these losses,
likely leading to uncertainty among its members. Research in political polarization shows that
when the entitativity of a group changes, it can cause members to either flee, change the
direction of the group, or even attempt to regain normality (Forgas, Fiedler, & Crano, 2015).
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This shift in entitativity might have resulted in a reduction of identity-based messages over time
in the Dabiq.
Our second hypothesis stated that columns in the Dabiq would have more motivational
messages, whereas tweets on Twitter will have more idealistic and personal posts. Twitter posts
tend to focus more on idealistic messages, pushing an idea of a Utopia (Winter, 2015a). This
Utopian ideal translates to a push for enlistment. Conversely, the Dabiq used stories and
apocalyptic messages specifically designed to reinforce an urgency to enlist (Ingram, 2016). The
messages in both channels were similar, encouraging individuals to join the Caliphate; however,
the channels differed in the methods employed to obtain recruits. Results revealed that the Dabiq
contained significantly more time pressure messages as compared to the Twitter. Contrary to our
hypothesis, however, the Dabiq also contained significantly more explicit pushes for enlistment
compared to Twitter. As ISIS lost ground throughout the first half of 2016 (see Appendix A),
they began to spread stronger messages of time pressure as a plea for recruitment. As with the
first hypothesis, this may have been a result of a widespread uncertainty among ISIS’s members.
It an attempt to steer their members back to normality, ISIS materials encouraged enlistment and
focused on time pressure within a journal that was primarily used by active members (Forgas, et
al., 2015).
Our last hypothesis was that Dabiq articles would have more religious content compared
to Twitter posts. Previous research has shown that the Dabiq focused more on theology (Greene,
2015), whereas Twitter posts tend to steer clear of blatant religiosity (Bodine-Baron, et al. 2016).
Our findings supported our hypothesis, finding that Allah was mentioned significantly more in
the issues of the Dabiq compared to tweets. In support of this finding, results also showed that
the Dabiq contained significantly more religious messages compared to Twitter. These results
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support previous research showing that the Dabiq focuses on justification for action using
theology. Social media messages merely acted as a light introduction to potential recruits, only
using enough religiosity to create entitativity (Bodine-Baron, et al. 2016).
Limitations
Dabiq. There were several limitations to consider when using the Dabiq. First, it was
published in 4 languages, including English and Arabic. For this study, the researchers only used
the English version; therefore, English coders might have missed subtleties contained within the
Arabic language in Arabic versions of the Dabiq. Arabic readers could potentially have found
different results based on this deeper level of understanding of the language. Second, the Dabiq
is jargon-heavy, including many references to language from the Qur’an. Although the
researchers in the current study did their best to define this language, someone who is
comfortable with the Qur’an may have also found different results, particularly in terms of
religiosity. Third, the Dabiq was terminated. It is unclear why this happened, but it may have
coincided with the downfall of Dabiq, the city, as the capital of ISIS (Withnall, 2016). Because
of its termination, it is unclear that future issues would be any different than the 13 that were
analyzed, or the journal that replaced it, titled Rumiyah, would have had a different focus. It is
clear, however, that there would be some variation based on real world events (see Figure 2 as a
reference).
Twitter. Researchers and security personnel alike have increased their focus on Twitter
and other social media channels because the amount of ISIS members and sympathizers who use
their platform (Magdy et al., 2015). As the number of ISIS affiliates grew on Twitter, so did the
pressure to remove them. Business leaders of Twitter used a variety of methods to address the
issue of online radicalization leading to violence, but the strategy that seems most effective is the
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Twitter community itself. Other users on Twitter have been able to effectively disturb the
distribution of ISIS material by either using their hashtags (called #OpISIS), or by hunting and
reporting the accounts (#Anon). The reports by members of the Twitter community have caused
Twitter employees to routinely suspend suspected profiles. Although the removal of tweets
supporting violent groups is a positive sign, the deletion of these profiles has impacted research
into online recruitment. For instance, searching the hashtags used in Magdy et al. (2015) will
result in blank searches. Although removing these tweets is a major step forward in ending
ISIS’s Virtual Caliphate, it has proven difficult for the researchers in the current study to identify
a substantial amount of confirmed ISIS tweets.
Another potential confound between the different channels of the Dabiq and Twitter is
that, at the time of data collection, Twitter was restricting the author’s word count to 140
characters. This restriction does not exist in the Dabiq and may have caused the difference in
content. If an individual is restricted to character count, they might be more likely to focus on the
key points of their message, radicalization. Infusing tweets with religiosity or other types of
appeals would limit the types of recruitment messages that a poster could make. The Dabiq was
unrestricted, allowing for the authors to expand and add multiple concepts to a single column.
Recommendations
ISIS no longer has an influential presence on Twitter, and the platform has begun a
campaign to eliminate all extremist accounts. The lack of security on publically accessible social
media networks for radicals has led them to expand to other platforms. These new platforms are
virtual treasure troves of information about terrorist groups and their recruiting methods. Future
researchers will benefit from expanding their analyses of social media radicalization to more
burgeoning platforms, such as Telegram (Berger & Perez, 2016). Telegram began as a backup
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for Twitter, but became the main platform for ISIS due to the creation of “Channels” (similar to
Facebook Groups). These Channels allowed the spread of ISIS propaganda to an unlimited
number of followers (Berger, et al. 2016). In order to gain even wider diffusion, ISIS created
Telegram Channels in multiple languages, using female fighters to administrate the accounts
(Yayla & Speckhard, 2017). Telegram also became an application to allow ISIS engineers and
scientists to communicate about their projects in designated Channels (Almohammad &
Speckhard, 2017). These features make Telegram the perfect home for extremists who seek to
conceal their activities and still maintain widespread propaganda dispersal.
Researchers will also benefit from pursuing research into newer printed publications. The
Dabiq was terminated in mid-2016, so its content is not relevant or accurate to their current
geopolitical situation. ISIS had several journals, and each was terminated and replaced. The
differences between these journals remain unclear, but the timing of each publication is
important. Many terrorist organizations release their own journals, such as the Al-Qaeda journal
Inspire. It is beneficial to use current materials from groups that are active at the time of data
collection (Reed & Ingram, 2017). The current study began at the height of ISIS’s Dabiq, and
finished shortly after it was terminated. Researchers should find the most recent publications in
order to gain the most accurate view of a particular organization, at a particular point in time.
For instance, Twitter was at its peak popularity during the publication of Dabiq, so it would be
inappropriate to use Twitter as a comparison group for a later published journal, like ISIS’s
Rumiyah.
Implications
Multinational terrorist networks such as ISIS pose a unique threat to the safety and
security of sovereign countries worldwide. The current project attempted understand ISIS
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recruitment through an investigation of how their messages changed across distribution channels.
The current study showed that messages in support of ISIS seem to harbor implicit rather than
explicit recruitment appeals. The true intent of a particular message may be tempered to make it
more palatable to outsiders (Borum, 2011; Magdy, et al., 2015; Winter, 2015a). In the current
study, we observed that Twitter appeals contained less explicitly religious content than the Dabiq
columns. Social media platforms such as Twitter likely are used to introduce individuals to the
ideology of ISIS. The Dabiq, and similar formal media channels, seemed to appeal to a more
targeted, informed audience.
Through a variety of media publications, ISIS fills the psychological needs of their media
consumers. Borum (2011) found that ISIS offers a sense of belonging to individuals who are
feeling disconnected from society. ISIS achieved this by creating a sense of connectedness, using
the idea of a religious group identity. For individuals who are isolated or outcasts, this group
identity would promise a well-established caliphate, a place for like-minded individuals to thrive.
These messages to followers are not unitary in their focus, however, as the Dabiq provided
diverse messages to reach a diverse audience.
This study confirmed that there is no “one size fits all” solution, where one could create a
Twitter account and offer strength to vulnerable people. This was clearly seen when the U.S.
State Department created a social media campaign and Twitter profile called “Think Again, Turn
Away.” This program was widely regarded as a failure, as it oversimplified the approach to
countering violent extremism (Katz, 2014). The current study showed that this issue is a complex
one, and the oversimplification of a counter approach would likely lead to a failed program.
Past studies have offered multi-faceted solutions to the complex issue of online extremist
recruitment, to avoid the pitfall of simplicity. Sorenson (2014) suggested that to combat the
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message of ISIS, you must use Islam. ISIS continually uses Islamic teachings to support their
actions, so the counter narrative should also include Islamic teachings. Tucker (2016) supported
this idea, showing that theologically literate Muslims are the strongest opposition to ISIS. These
Muslims are wise to false interpretations that are disseminated to the less-informed recruits.
To apply these principles, policy makers need to first understand how the terrorist’s
online recruitment machine is organized. This study showed that the Dabiq contained much more
religiously oriented messages than Twitter. Twitter served as an introduction to the ideology
whereas the Dabiq provided more in-depth, religious explanations for recruitment. Adding
religious references to counterterrorism social media posts could serve as an inoculation
(McGuire, 1964) to the messages that recruits will receive later through more formal channels
like the Dabiq. This concept is called “forewarned and forearmed,” where an introductory
message warns the listener about the impending persuasive message, allowing the listener to put
up a guard against it. These forewarning messages lead to persuasive resistance if the
forewarning message appeals to the need of the receiver (i.e., the recruit) to avoid being duped
by extreme messages (Wood & Quinn, 2003). A social media message that points out flaws of
the religious appeals of ISIS supporters with a caution not to be fooled by such messages, for
example, especially if they come from a credible source (Braddock & Morrison, 2018)., could
serve as effective countermeasures to reduce the persuasive religious appeals that will come later
in the recruitment process through more official extremist group channels.
Conclusion
During the initial stages of this study, ISIS was at its peak. Now that ISIS’s strength is
depleting, other groups will likely rise to take their place; much like the Lernaean Hydra in
Greek mythology. As other groups, like Al-Qaeda, are resurging in the Islamic State’s shadow,
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policy makers need to focus on new ways to limit recruitment. The goal of this research was to
better understand the threat that faces Western Civilization. Regardless of the title or ideology of
the next terrorist group, the methods they use will likely be improved from the previous group.
The current study adds to a growing body of research aimed at preventing groups like ISIS from
gaining membership. If researchers, policy makers, and government agencies can understand the
structure and channels of radical appeals made by terrorist organizations, perhaps they can create
effective, individualized, counter appeals. Whether it is a hard copy or a hashtag, researchers and
security professionals must continue to monitor, study, and interpret recruitment appeals by
extremist groups. Terrorism is now a daily reality, and as radical terrorist groups adapt and
change to practical realities, so must our ways of understanding them.
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Appendix A
Timeline of Notable ISIS Events as they relate to Dabiq Issue Releases
Year

ISIS Critical Event

2014 June 29: ISIS announces the establishment of a
Caliphate and rebrands itself as the “Islamic State.”
Aug. 7: President Obama announces the beginning of
air strikes against ISIS in Iraq to defend Yazidi
citizens stranded in Sinjar.
Sept. 23: The United States launches its first air strikes
against ISIS in Syria.
Oct. 15: The Pentagon names the campaign against
ISIS “Operation Inherent Resolve.”

2015 Jan. 26: Kurdish fighters, with the help of U.S. and
Coalition airstrikes, force out ISIS militants from the
Syrian border town of Kobani after a four-month
battle.

May 17: ISIS take overs Ramadi, Iraq.
May 20: ISIS seizes the ancient Syrian city
of Palmyra.
May 21: ISIS militants take full control of Sirte, Libya
– Muammar Qaddafi's hometown.

Sept. 30: Russia begins airstrikes in Syria. It claims to
target ISIS, but U.S. officials allege that many of the
strikes target civilians and Western-backed rebel
groups.

Dabiq Issue

Dabiq Issue 1, July 5th, 2014
Dabiq Issue 2, July 27th, 2014

Dabiq Issue 3,
September 10th, 2014
Dabiq Issue 4,
October 11th, 2014
Dabiq Issue 5,
November 21st, 2014
Dabiq Issue 6,
December 29th, 2014

Dabiq Issue 7,
February 12th, 2015
Dabiq Issue 8,
March 30th, 2015

Dabiq Issue 9,
May 21st, 2015
Dabiq Issue 10,
July 13th, 2015
Dabiq Issue 11,
September 9th, 2015
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2016

Dec. 10: U.S. officials announce that airstrikes killed
ISIS finance minister Abu Saleh and two other senior
leaders in Tal Afar, Iraq.
Dec. 27: Iraqi military forces seize Ramadi from ISIS.
April 11: Iraqi forces seize the town of Hit, which had
been under ISIS control since October 2014. The same
day, ISIS recaptured Rai, a Syrian town on the Turkish
border, from the Free Syrian Army.
May 19: Iraqi forces retake the western town of
Rutbah.
June 26: The Iraqi army retakes Fallujah from ISIS.

August 24: Turkish Military began offensive against
Dabiq, Syria.

October 16: ISIS officially loses prophesied
stronghold of Dabiq, Syria.
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Dabiq Issue 12,
November 18th, 2015

Dabiq Issue 13,
January 19th, 2016

Dabiq Issue 14,
April 13th, 2016

Dabiq Last Issue,
15, July 31st, 2016

Dabiq is terminated and
replaced by Rumiyah Issue 1,
September 3rd, 2016

